This article expands upon formal research on elections by considering competition in a dynamic environment of multiple elections. The key assumptions are that the ideology of the electorate is changing in a known way, parties cannot change their position from one election to the next, and one party has a non-ideological advantage in the first election. A deterministic version of this game shows that with a large valence advantage for one party, both parties will converge to the median for a future election. With a small valence advantage, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, so a stochastic version of the game is considered. With probabilistic voting, parties place themselves closer to the present median, but move towards the future median the more highly they value winning in the future and the less uncertain they are about election outcomes.
Introduction
How do political parties place themselves ideologically if their behavior has contradictory short-and long-term electoral consequences? Strategic politicians are likely to consider how the world around them is changing and what their behavior means for future electoral prospects, but most of the formal literature on party competition in elections focuses on single-shot elections. Of the research that does consider repeated elections, much of it focuses on the policies politicians enact once in office, showing that in some cases policy-motivated parties or candidates will take divergent strategies.
1 Additionally, some studies consider how candidates should place themselves if they need to win a primary and a general election with a sticky issue position. Aranson and Ordeshook (1972) consider a version of this game that is soluble if the candidate has a prior belief about his or her opponent's issue position, while Coleman (1972) shows results when conditions occur that lead the candidate to worry only about winning the primary. This article adds a new perspective to strategic placement by considering how parties should place themselves when their positions are sticky and they compete in multiple general elections. Placing political parties in this context of multiple elections would facilitate understanding of the actions of forward-looking parties that simply want to win elections. This paper reports how rational parties should behave in this situation.
The model that I investigate has three essential features. First, the median voter in the electorate changes positions in a predictable way over two elections. Second, in the first of the two elections one of the parties has an advantage based on valence factors.
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Third, the position the party adopts is fixed across the two elections. The model has two features that are common to spatial voting models. I assume that any issue based advantage that accrues to one party over the other is based on the relative proximity of the parties (Hotelling, 1929; Downs, 1957) . Voters prefer parties that are closer. 3 The model also allows for a discounting of the second election compared to the first. Utility in all cases derives from winning office rather than any intrinsic reward based on ideology.
The three potentially controversial features are all motivated by an interest in understanding rational behavior in a dynamic environment. The fact that the median changes in a predictable way is the driving element of the model. For this question to be interesting, parties must necessarily be constrained by past position. Certainly there is ample evidence that parties do not change positions easily, at least in mass perception, and when they do it is often costly. 4 The final feature, valence advantage in the first 2 Stokes defines a valence advantage as an issue that involves "the linking of the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate " (1963: 373) .
3 See appendix B for similar results from the directional model of voter utility (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) . The results are worth considering because much research shows that the proximity model fails to meet empirical expectations Rabinowitz, 1978) or that empirical models cannot discern between the proximity and directional model (Lewis and King, 2000) .
4 Noteworthy is that the American National Election Studies have been collecting data on the perceived election, is introduced to give the model empirical credibility and provide a natural rationale for party divergence: a significant body of research demonstrates how valence advantages can promote divergent strategies in party ideological self-placement (Adams et al., 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Schofield, 2003) . Thus, the goal is to present a meaningful, yet reasonable and tractable model for understanding the ideological motivation of parties in dynamic environments.
What is the best strategy for a party to take in these situations? Does the optimal strategy differ between a party with a valence advantage and one with a disadvantage?
This article explains how rational parties should react to the strategic considerations of dynamic issues like these. Section 2 takes the assumptions just described, formally defines a deterministic model, and explains the results. Because a hard-to-interpret result emerges with the deterministic game, section 3 makes the case for a stochastic model and reports equilibrium behavior and comparative statics found through a simulation-based analysis. Finally, the substantive importance of the findings is discussed.
A Deterministic Model
To formalize the assumptions, for the first and second election the median voter, m t , evaluates each of the parties as follows:
Here, U represents the utility a voter gets from a certain party winning the election.
t is the time of the election (1 for present, 2 for future). The two parties the voter positions of the Democratic and Republican parties on a limited number of issues since 1972, and these positions have been remarkably stable.
evaluates are an advantaged party (A) and a disadvantaged party (D). Because A is the advantaged party, the median voter in the first election (m 1 ) adds V , a positive and constant non-ideological utility, to his or her evaluation of A. Again, the assumption is that a valence advantage will not persist over time, so V is zero and the valence term drops out in the second election. Lastly, the utility of ideological proximity is the negative squared distance between the voter's ideal point and the position taken by each party;
θ A & θ D represent the issue positions staked-out by the advantaged and disadvantaged party, respectively. In each of the elections, the median voter will elect the party from which it receives a higher utility.
The principal result is that there is only a pure strategy equilibrium if the valence advantage is so large in the first election that the advantaged party can adopt position m 2 , the median voter's position in the second election, while still being assured of winning the first election. Figure 1 shows the intuition as to why this is the case. In each panel, 
A Stochastic Version of the Game
Since the deterministic game only has a pure strategy equilibrium if one party has a very large non-ideological advantage in the present election, the parties would have to take a mixed strategy to find an equilibrium. Since parties' issue positions are announced publicly to the voters, they are also highly visible to the opposing party. It therefore would be difficult to substantively interpret probabilistic party issue placement. This article will keep with the trend of other spatial research by focusing on pure strategy equilibria.
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In particular, this article looks for pure party strategies in a model where voters vote probabilistically. In fact, a number of studies show more stable equilibria for probabilistic voting models than the often fragile results of deterministic voting models (Coughlin and Nitzan, 1981; Ledyard, 1984; McKelvey, 1975; Wittman, 1995) . Probabilistic voting is possible if there is a stochastic element of utility. This notion is natural to politics because some last-minute news event or the way a candidate's campaign is perceived could influence voters' choices. 11 However, politicians cannot anticipate this effect ahead of time, so a random draw from a probability distribution is added to voters' utility from each party. The ultimate result is that the parties face uncertainty in the election outcome and can only hope to maximize their probability of winning an election. Nothing is guaranteed.
Under this model, the median voter in each election evaluates the parties as follows:
To illustrate the norm in the spatial literature, Adams et al. (2005) describe cases without a fixed point equilibrium as lacking an equilibrium.
11 Several studies offer justifications for probabilistic voting, including Coughlin et al. (1990) , Hinich (1977) , & Hinich and Munger (1994) . For a review, see Mueller (2003) .
The equations of 2 are the same as those of equation 1, with the addition that each represents utility coming from a stochastic draw from a probability distribution.
12 With probabilistic election results, parties' expected utilities become the sum of utilities from winning, weighted by the probability of winning. Solving for a closed-form solution with such utility functions is impossible.
13 Hence, the remainder of this article searches for equilibria by following a growing trend of using computer simulations to analyze insoluble games. 14 In particular, this analysis searches for equilibria based on fixed values of the game's parameters. 
Results
The most surprising result of this stochastic model is that parties never diverge from each other. This contrasts from the aforementioned models of voting behavior with a valence advantage, which show that valence causes parties to take differing positions (Adams et al., 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Schofield, 2003) . It also is surprising because some of the literature on competition in repeated elections shows incentives for divergent positions (Alesina, 12 Specifically, they are drawn from a standard Gumbel distribution. This distribution looks like a skewed normal and is chosen because the resulting probability that voter m t will vote for a party in a given election has a standard logistic distribution.
13 Specifically, party A's expected utility is
, where δ is the value of the future election, and Λ 1 & Λ 2 are different logistic distribution functions. Solving for the maximum of this equation would require solving for the parties' behavior parameters in a sum of transcendental functions. This is algebraically impossible, so the game does not yield a closed-form equation for a party's optimal response. This problem would emerge with several probability distributions besides logistic, including the normal distribution.
14 For an accessible introduction to the utility of analyzing games without an analytic solution, see Miller and Page (2007) .
15 For treatments manipulating the values of δ (future discount), V (valence advantage), and s (the logistic scale parameter), the behavior of both parties is varied from −1 to 1 in increments of 0.001. Considering this discrete strategy set, rather than a continuous strategy space, a program reports the Nash equilibrium for each treatment. Simulations were done in R 2.6.1 for Red Hat Linux on UNC's Emerald computing cluster (R Development Core Team, 2008) . The simulation code is available from the author; at the time of writing, example code can be found at http://www.unc.edu/~monogan/research/ variance_SIMULATIONS_1000.R. The program should work for any version of R that includes the S4 class of objects.
1988; Harrington, 1992) . In fact, even though a general solution cannot be found to this game, it can be proved that the parties will match in any equilibrium. Intuitively, if the parties take different positions, then each party can improve its expected utility by moving towards the other party's position. Since there is an incentive for parties to change strategies when they do not match, we have the intuition behind observation 3:
Observation 3 Any equilibrium is characterized by the feature that the parties will take the same issue stance, whatever that stance may be.
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In addition to convergence, the simulations show that party behavior responds to the value of the future election and the amount of uncertainty parties face in electoral outcomes, but valence advantage only has a marginal effect. In particular, parties will converge to a position near the first election's median voter, but as the value that the parties place on the second election rises, approaching the value of the first election, the parties place themselves farther from the present median voter to be closer to the future median voter. Furthermore, the parties' position is more sensitive to the value of the future election when there is less variance in the stochastic element of voter utility, with the parties making bigger moves towards the future median voter for each increase in the discount parameter. Substantively, this means that the less uncertain parties are about election outcomes, the more they will play to win in the future. Lastly, a larger valence advantage leads parties to place themselves marginally closer to the future median voter, though the effect increases somewhat if the value of the future election (δ) is higher or if the variance of voters' stochastic utility is higher.
The Nash equilibria for all treatments are reported in table 1. Table 1 Notice that as the value of the future election (δ) increases, parties place themselves closer to the future median. Equilibrium positions range from the present median voter's ideal point (0.700, 0.700) whenever the future election has no value to a position that is closer to the future median voter than it is the present median voter (-0.020, -0.020) when the variance of voters' stochastic utility term is small, the future election is 90%
as valuable as the present election, and there is a large valence advantage. Notice too that valence has little impact on the equilibrium. In any case when the second election has any value (δ > 0), the parties place themselves a little closer to the future median as valence increases, and this effect gets bigger as the value of the second election increases.
To a very slight degree, the effect of valence on equilibrium movement is greater in the higher variance case. Overall, though, valence does little to influence party behavior.
Conclusion
Although research has shown that some of this model's features, such as sequential elections and a valence advantage, lead parties to take different issue stances, this model with sticky party positions and probabilistic voting leads parties to adopt the same position. So for both the equilibrium case in the deterministic game and in all cases in the stochastic game, the traditional Hotelling-Downs result of party convergence in a single issue dimension holds, though the parties often match at an off-median position. The stochastic model also shows that the position at which parties match is closer to the future median voter the more certain the parties are about the outcome of the present election.
When the variance of the stochastic utility term is large, leaving more to chance, the parties are more inclined to stay close to the present median. With a smaller stochastic variance or a larger valence advantage term, the outcome of the present election is more certain, so parties have more of an incentive to cheat towards the future median voter and influence the future election, which is decided strictly by ideology. This movement becomes even stronger when there is a greater reward for winning the future election, which emerges when the discounting factor increases.
So how might these results be applied to understanding real politics? Several issues are likely to fit the dynamic described in this game. One of these issues is immigration.
Much anti-immigrant discourse has an anti-Latino feel to it. So even if some elites want to push a strict view on immigration without an anti-Latino message, prior discourse might make it difficult to separate ethnic considerations from the immigration issue. Taking a strong anti-immigrant stance might win over voters who hold an anti-Latino sentiment, and this strategy could make a substantial contribution to winning a plurality of voters in the short term. However, the growing Latino population, which will surely overtake the number of voters with anti-Latino sentiments, likely will react unfavorably to such a position in the long term. Immigration, therefore, provides an example of an issue for which public ideology is changing on account of demographic change.
Another example is the environment, for which the problems of current policy are abundantly clear to experts. As the public learns more about the dangers of global warming, scarce potable water, and other environmental hazards, it can only become more pro-environmental. Rational elites might have short-term electoral success by arguing the merits of less green policies for jobs and businesses. However, they also ought to consider future electoral movement when they choose their environmental policy positions. For example, they might promote policies such as offshore drilling to fill petrol-based energy demands and thereby win popular support today. However, future voters who will be more aware of the consequences of carbon emissions likely will punish parties who have advocated such positions in the past. Therefore, the environment is an issue for which public ideology ought to change due to an information flow.
So what positions will candidates for office take on issues like immigration and the environment? To start, party institutions are more likely to be concerned with party prospects in future elections than individual candidates are. Therefore, in instances where parties have more levers of control over the issue stances adopted by their candidates, the positions ought to be more future-oriented than instances when parties have fewer control mechanisms over candidates. For example, places with stronger parties are more likely to have candidates who are welcoming on immigration and who favor environmental regulations. Since both parties ought to converge to the same position, we also would expect to see more policy action that is future-oriented in constituencies with stronger parties. Similarly, the equilibrium from the deterministic game showed that with a large valence advantage, parties ought to converge to a position favorable to the future electorate, and the stochastic game showed a moderate increase in future-oriented position taking as valence advantage increases. Therefore, in elections where the leading candidate at the start of the election has a larger lead or when incumbents enter an election with an economy that is over-or underperforming to a great degree, we ought to see the candidates taking more future-oriented positions than in elections where the frontrunner has a smaller lead or economic growth is moderate.
A final use of this model would be to take a new look at optimal strategies ahead of primary elections. As the aforementioned literature on primaries notes, the structure of an election with primaries is similar to the game just considered: candidates want to win two elections, the median voter in a general election has a different ideal point from the median voter in a primary constituency, and candidates are likely stuck with the positions they take in the primaries because flip-flopping is not credible in the span of a few months. 17 So whether analyzing issues with clear trends in the electorate or primary politics, understanding the placement of sticky party positions can be useful for several real political questions.
Of course, models are inherently limited. The formal assumptions at best only modestly match real world dynamics. What models accomplish, however, is a means to analyze the fundamental strategic logic of a particular context-in this case party and candidate placement on issues that change in known directions.
17 The major change from this article's game would be that the winners of two separate elections would compete in a general election, but utility is only awarded for winning the general election.
A Appendix: Formal Derivation of the Results
Propositions 1 & 2 formally demonstrate the results of the deterministic game, while proposition 3 focuses on the stochastic game. Proposition 1 proves the presence of an equilibrium in the deterministic game whenever valence is large relative to the ideological movement of the median voter (see observation 1). Proposition 2 shows why there is no equilibrium in the deterministic game whenever valence is small relative to the movement of the median voter (see observation 2). Finally, proposition 3 demonstrates that in any equilibrium for the stochastic game, the parties will match positions (see observation 3).
Proposition 1 Under proximity voter utilities, when
2 , it is a Nash equilibrium if the parties converge to the second median voter's ideal point.
Proof If both parties play θ = m 2 , then A earns 1 + , without gaining anything. This is because A will win the first election for θ A = m 2 regardless of the value of θ D .
Since neither party will defect, θ A = θ D = m 2 is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under proximity voter utilities, when V ≤ (m 1 − m 2 ) 2 , there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof D will win the first election if:
Therefore, D's best response function is:
This is because whenever θ A ≥ m 1 − √ V party A has placed itself sufficiently close to m 1 that D cannot win the first election, so D will play for the second election (m 2 ).
Whenever θ A < m 1 − √ V , though, party D can win the first election by taking a position very close to m 1 . Party A can win both elections, so its best response function is:
Given these best response functions, there is no Nash equilibrium for the game when valence does not exceed the square of ideological movement. First for the case when θ A ≥ m 1 − √ V , for an equilibrium to exist the parties would have to play in a way such that θ D < θ A and θ D > θ A . This is logically impossible, so both players cannot play a best response. Second, for the case when θ A < m 1 − √ V , it can be shown that the parties would have to play such that (
which is also logically impossible. Hence, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium whenever
Proposition 3 For any Nash equilibrium of the stochastic game with proximity utilities, the two parties will match in their behavior (θ *
Proof Because this is a zerosum game, we can say that (θ *
Nash equilibria if the following three conditions are true (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994: proposition 22.2.c):
2. θ * D = θ A must be a maxminimizer for D.
3. max
First, considering condition 1, is θ * A = θ D a maxminimizer for A? A's expected utility function is:
Where Λ represents the logistic distribution function.
for any value of θ A , then θ * A = θ D is a maxminimizer for A.
To determine whether this is true, we will represent any other strategy that A can take as θ A = θ D + η, where η is the difference between θ A & θ D . It can be shown that A's expected utility for θ A is:
So the key question is now whether Λ(V ) + δΛ(0) ≥ min 
We know that this minimized utility is less than or equal to the utility when θ * A = θ D because each corresponding probability term is less than or equal to its counterpart from 18 η = 0 simply produces θ * A = θ D , which all other strategies are being compared to.
the logistic distribution function on the right side of the equation contains a negative term. 20 Therefore, for any η > 0:
So for no positive η will A earn a better minimized utility than it gets by matching party D's position. Now consider the case when A plays a position more liberal than D (η < 0).
By a similar argument to the previous case, it can be shown that:
Within each logistic distribution function on the right side of equation 11, every term other than V (which is also part of the corresponding left-side term) is negative. 21 Between equations 9 & 11, we can conclude that Λ(V ) + δΛ(0) ≥ min
for all η and therefore θ * A = θ D is a maxminimizer for party A. 
If ζ > 0, party A can maximize its utility by playing θ A = 1, but if ζ < 0 party A can maximize its utility by playing θ A = −1. Consider first whether party D would want to play a strategy more conservative than party A (ζ > 0). Substituting θ A = 1:
Equation 13 holds because each term within the logistic distribution functions on the far right side is nonnegative. 22 Therefore, party D would never like to play a more conservative position than party A since matching θ A reduces A's maximum utility. Now consider whether party D would want to play a strategy more liberal than party A (ζ < 0). Substituting θ A = −1:
Again, all of the terms in the logistic distribution functions on the far right side are nonnegative because ζ is now negative and is subtracted from the equation. Therefore, the inequality relationship holds. Between equations 13 & 14, we can conclude that Λ(V ) + δΛ(0) ≤ max for party D.
Finally, condition 3 is trivial to demonstrate at this point. In proving the previous two conditions, we demonstrated first that max
Since these two quantities are the same, condition 3 is true. Therefore, all three conditions are satisfied for θ * A = θ * D to characterize all Nash equilibria.
B Appendix: The Model with Directional Theory
In the directional model of voter utility, voters vote for candidates who are on the same side of policy space as themselves before they will vote for any candidate on the opposite side of the space (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989) . Additionally, the more a politician emphasizes the symbolism of one side, the higher he or she will be rated by voters on that side and the lower he or she will be rated by voters on the other side. The unidimensional result with two parties is convergence to the outside bounds of the policy space, though candidates stop short of taking a position for which they could be labeled an extremist.
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Equation 15 formalizes the way voters directionally evaluate parties:
Just as in equation 1, U is the voter's utility from a party, m t is the median voter's ideal point at time t ∈ {1, 2}, θ is the party's position, and V is a constant non-ideological utility that the first median voter (m 1 ) adds to its evaluation of party A in the first Proposition 5 Under directional voter utilities, when V ≤ 2m 1 , there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof Under these circumstances, D will win the first election if:
Otherwise, A will win. Therefore, D's best response function is:
This is because whenever θ A + On the other hand, party A can win both elections, so its best response function is:
In order to win the second election, party A has to play something lower than θ D . In order to simultaneously win the first election, though, A needs to be close enough to D that party D's ideological advantage with the first voter is smaller than A's valence advantage.
Given these best response functions, there is no Nash equilibrium for the game when < θ A , which is also impossible. Hence, there is no pure strategy equilibrium whenever V ≤ 2m 1 .
B.1 The Directional Model with Probabilistic Voting
Similar to the stochastic model with proximity utilities, this subsection presents a version of the game in which voters evaluate parties' issue positions directionally, but vote probabilistically. This is again created by adding a shock to voter utilities in the form of a random draw from a probability distribution: Where the parties switch strategies depends on their level of uncertainty: as the variance of the voters' stochastic utility term decreases, the value of the future election that draws parties to the other side of the issue decreases. Hence, the effect that the value of the future has on party strategies is conditional on uncertainty and relative extremity of the present and future electorates.
